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Abstract 
This thesis consists of four separate experimental studies that concern individuals’ 
preferences and choices on issues of risk, inequality and relative standing.  
In the first paper, individuals' aversion to risk and inequality, and their concern for 
relative standing, are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical 
societies. It is found that, on average, that individuals are both fairly inequality-averse 
and have a strong concern for relative income. The results are used to illustrate welfare 
consequences based on a utilitarian SWF and a modified CRRA utility function. It is 
shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative, even at 
income levels that are far from extreme.  
The second paper measures individuals’ preferences for risk and inequality using 
choices between imagined societies and lotteries. Most of the respondents in the study 
are found to be individually inequality averse, reflecting a willingness to pay for living 
in a more equal society. Left-wing voters and women are both more risk and inequality 
averse than others. 
The model allows for non-monotonic SWFs, implying that welfare may decrease with 
an individual’s income at high income levels, which is illustrated in simulations based 
on the empirical results. 
The third paper tests the relative performance of some of the competing social 
preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from economic 
experiments.  This is done using an experimental design that is aimed at capturing pure 
distributional concerns in a multi-person setting.  We find that the individuals in this 
study are heterogeneous and that they do not follow any single notion of fairness or 
inequality aversion. In addition, the results suggest that efficiency concerns are not 
confined to students of economics but are important to students of all disciplines. 
The fourth paper reports results from an economic experiment where respondents are 
asked to make choices between risky outcomes for themselves and others. In addition, 
we elicit information about the respondents’ perception of others risk preferences. We 
investigate whether subjects’ own risk preferences and gender stereotypes are reflected 
in the prediction they make for the risk preferences of others and the way this occurs. 
We find no significant difference in risk preferences between men and women in the 
experiment. However, both men and women perceive women to be more risk averse 
than men. When predicting other people’s risk preferences, the respondents tend to use 
a combination of their own risk preferences and stereotypes.  Moreover, when making 
risky choices for others, the respondents generally use a combination of their own risk 
preferences and their average predicted risk preference of the targeted group.  
Preface 
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subsidies on bio fuel. After more than two years of pouring over endless statistics on 
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doubts regarding my choice of vocation. My heartfelt thanks to my supervisors Fredrik 
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the key to my continuing with the task – they never let me get in a rut and excelled at 
motivating me through each step. 
Their encouragement and inspiration led me to realise not only the value and worth of 
Experimental Economics as a valid field of study but along the way demonstrated that it 
could be fun as well. Good fortune indeed to be given the opportunity to work with two 
brilliant economists who were so very generous with their time and knowledge and 
patient with my various personal idiosyncrasies. 
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Would The Right Social Preference Model Please Stand Up! 
 
Dinky Daruvala 
Karlstad University 
 
Abstract 
A number of competing social preference models have been developed inspired by the evidence from 
economic experiments.  We test the relative performance of some of these models using an experimental 
design that is aimed at capturing pure distributional concerns in a multi-person setting.  We find that the 
individuals in this study are heterogeneous and that they do not follow any single notion of fairness or 
inequality aversion. In addition, the results suggest that efficiency concerns are not confined to students of 
economics but are important to students of all disciplines. 
 
Keywords: Difference Aversion, Efficiency, Inequality Aversion, Maximin Criterion, Social Preferences. 
 
JEL Classification: A13, C91, D63. 
 
1. Introduction 
A number of social preference models have been developed in an effort to explain and 
organize the evidence from economic experiments. It has been found that people share 
with others in dictator games, reject offers in ultimatum games, cooperate in public 
good games etc., all of which is in direct conflict with traditional microeconomic utility 
theory. 
 
Fehr (2001) distinguishes between two approaches used when explaining the behaviour 
observed in experiments. The first assumes that some agents have social preferences 
such that their utility depends not only on their own material payoff but also on how 
much the other players receive. The second approach deals with “intention based 
reciprocity” where it is assumed that the player cares about the intention of her 
opponent. Although there is much evidence that perceived intentions are often 
important, this paper focuses solely on the former. Thus, the experiments designed here 
aim to capture “pure” social preferences, i.e. the nature of distributional concerns rather 
than strategic or retaliatory preferences. Consequently, this study examines how people 
respond to unfair outcomes rather than unfair intentions. More specifically, the purpose 
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of this paper is to test the performance of some of the better known social preference 
theories of difference-aversion, maximin preferences and efficiency concerns using real 
money distributional experiments.  
 
One category of social preference models are difference aversion models such as those 
put forward by Loewenstein, Bazerman and Thompson (1989), Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). These models presume that individuals are 
averse to differences in relative payoffs and would therefore never sacrifice from their 
own payoff or reduce the payoff of others if the action resulted in a less equitable 
outcome. An alternative to the difference aversion models are social welfare models that 
combine distributional concerns with preferences for efficiency (surplus maximization). 
The Quasi-maximin model by Charness and Rabin (2000) is one of the more prominent 
social welfare models where Rawlsian maximin preferences are integrated with 
efficiency concerns.  
 
The various social preference models provide different explanations for the 
experimentally observed behaviour, but it is sometimes possible to explain the same 
experimental data using different models. For example, sharing in dictator games is 
explained by Andreoni and Miller (2002) as being due to maximin preferences while the 
same results can be explained by difference aversion according to Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Similarly rejections in ultimatum games and 
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games is ascribed to difference aversion by Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) while Rabin (1993) interprets such 
behaviour as reciprocity.  
 
A number of studies have examined and tested various social preference models 
including those discussed above. The difference aversion models do not incorporate 
efficiency but there is evidence indicating that efficiency is an important component in 
preferences. Studies by Charness and Grosskopf (2001), Kritikos and Bolle (2001), 
Andreoni and Miller (2002), Charness and Rabin (2000, 2002) as well as Engelmann 
and Strobel (2004) found that a majority of participants are efficiency rather than equity 
orientated.  Furthermore Andreoni and Miller (2002) construe participants who equalize 
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payoffs as exhibiting what Charness and Rabin (2000) describe as social-welfare 
preferences rather than difference aversion. Engelmann and Strobel compared the 
performance of the Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt models and found a clear 
influence of efficiency and maximin preferences. Overall they found that the Fehr-
Schmidt model fared better than the Bolton-Ockenfels model, but only when predicting 
the same choices as the Rawlsian principle. The jury is still out on this issue however. 
Fehr, Naef and Schmidt (2004) found that efficiency was of little concern when they 
replicated the experiments of Engelmann and Strobel using non-economist respondents. 
Furthermore, the authors raised doubts regarding the relevance of the Rawlsian motive 
in strategic games based partly on the experiments by Güth and van Damme (1998) as 
well as those by Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer (2003) where little concern was shown for 
the lowest pay-offs  suggesting that maximin preferences are of little importance in 
strategic interactions. Further support for the difference aversion theory is given by 
Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2003) who found that fairness concerns dominate 
efficiency concerns in dictator dilemma experiments where there is a trade-off between 
fairness and efficiency.1 The experiments by Güth and van Damme (1998), Bolton, 
Katok and Zwick (1998) amongst others are used by Bolton and Ockenfels  (2002) to 
support the theory of self-centred fairness that is embodied in their model. These results 
were not supported by Charness and Rabin (2000, 2002),2 who found that individuals 
did indeed care about the distributions of pay-offs among other parties. Kagel and 
Wolfe (2001) designed a 3-person modification of the ultimatum game in order to test 
the Fehr-Schmidt and Bolton and Ockenfels models.3 Their results show insensitivity to 
third party allocations and reject both the difference aversion models; furthermore, their 
results even fail to support social-welfare preferences. 
 
The lack of concurrence regarding the empirical evidence motivates further study into 
the nature of distributional concerns. This paper tests the relative performance of some 
                                                 
1 In dictator dilemma games, the recipient receives more than the dictator donates. 
2 The authors designed an experiment with a direct test of Bolton and Ockenfels hypothesis that 
individuals are unconcerned about the allocation among other parties. The results reject the Bolton and 
Ockenfels model but are consistent with both the social welfare and Fehr-Schmidt models. 
3 In this game, one person allocates a sum of money to two others, one of which is randomly chosen to 
accept or reject the offer. Rejection gives both the responder and the proposer zero income but a positive 
consolation prize is given to the non-responder. The results show little reduction in rejection rates, 
holding offers constant, with and without consolation prizes, contrary to the prediction of both difference 
aversion models. 
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of the more prominent social preference theories of difference-aversion, maximin 
preferences and efficiency concerns in distributional experiments using an approach that 
is somewhat different to previous studies. Firstly, within the standard approach 
experiments are conducted using  2 or 3 players and it is therefore of interest to observe 
if there is any strong correspondence to any of the social preference models when there 
are more players involved. In addition, the parameters of the models are rarely 
estimated in previous studies as the structures of these games do not usually provide 
sufficient information because they yield outcomes from choices that result in the 
highest utility for the individuals (dictator games, ultimatum games, binary choices 
between distributions etc) rather than indifference between choices. Finally and most 
importantly, the results from previous experiments do not always allow us to 
discriminate between the different models as the results are often consistent with more 
than one model. In this paper the experiments are conducted in groups of 11 individuals, 
where each subject is required to state what we call their “equality equivalence” for an 
unequal distribution for the group. We define equality equivalence as the value of the 
egalitarian pay-off for which the individual is indifferent between the unequal and the 
egalitarian outcome.4 As will be shown, the individuals’ responses classify them into 
one of the different models and the design of the experiment is such that membership in 
one of the models is mutually exclusive.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the 
experimental design and procedure followed by an overview of the different social 
preference models in sections 3.  The results from the study are presented in section 4 
followed by the conclusions in section 5. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 According to Rabin (1993) as well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), intentions play a role when 
individuals are motivated by reciprocity considerations.  If so, the individuals in this study, believing that 
the other respondents would base their choices out of “kindness” would wish to reciprocate this unselfish 
action. However this study disregards such effects assuming that the individuals’ responses reflect only 
their distributional concerns. 
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2. The Experiment 
2.1  Experimental Design 
We design an experiment where individuals’ preferences and the performance of the 
different models are evaluated by observing the equality equivalence (S) for three 
different distributions of money among the 11 subjects. The respondents were presented 
with three questions, for each of which there were two alternatives. Alternative 1 was a 
given (unequal) distribution for the group while Alternative 2 was the egalitarian 
distribution where the individual’s task was to choose the level of money (S) in each 
case so that she is indifferent between the pay-off distributions in Alternatives 1 and 2. 
In all three questions, the total surplus in Alternative 1 is 1800 SEK while the 
individuals pay-off is 300 SEK.5 The distributions in Alternative 1 differ in that the pay-
offs become more equal and in question 3 the lowest pay-off increases from 0 to 150 
SEK.  Furthermore, the individuals own pay-off is the highest in the group for the 
distributions in questions 2 and 3. The distributions of the three questions are presented 
in Figure 1 below.  A translation of the exact presentation of the questions is given in 
appendix B. 
 
Figure 1. Description of the distributions. 
Question 1 
Alternative 1   Alternative 2 
Individual i receives 300 SEK  Each individual (including i) receives S1 SEK. 
6 individuals receive 0 SEK 
3 individuals receive 300 SEK 
1 individual receives 600 SEK 
 
Question 2 
Alternative 1   Alternative 2 
Individual i receives 300 SEK  Each individual (including i) receives S2 SEK. 
5 individuals receive 0 SEK 
5 individuals receive 300 SEK 
 
Question 3 
Alternative 1   Alternative 2 
Individual i receives 300 SEK  Each individual (including i) receives S3 SEK. 
10 individuals receive 150 SEK 
note: i is the respondent 
 
                                                 
5 At the time the experiment was conducted, 1 USD = 7.3 SEK. 
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A modification of the incentive mechanism by Becker DeGroot Marschak (1964) is 
used to avoid strategic responses by the participants. All participants receive the same 
pay-off if the stated value for S is less than a subsequently drawn random number. This 
random number is also the pay-off of each individual. In the case where S coincides 
with or exceeds the randomly drawn number, the pay-offs are in accordance with 
Alternative 1. Respondents are restricted to stating values for S less than or equal to 300 
which is their payoff in Alternative 1. Thus, stating one's equality equivalence is the 
dominant strategy. The individuals can then be categorised into the different models. 
The alternatives were designed so that membership is mutually exclusive in that it is not 
possible for a respondent to belong to more than one group. 
 
While the behaviour of some participants appears to be consistent with the difference-
aversion models, it is possible that individuals may also have surplus concerns. In order 
to see whether concerns for efficiency are present, a follow up question was put to the 
participants. The question has similarities to the one sided dictator dilemma treatment 
used in the paper by Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2003). The original distribution is 
equal for all players so that each individual receives 100 SEK. Individual i has the 
possibility to donate money to the others in the group. For every SEK donated, the pay-
off of every other individual is increased by 0.25 SEK. Thus every SEK given away by 
individual i will increase the total surplus by 1.5 SEK. If the values of S given by 
individual i appear to correspond to the one of the difference aversion models above but 
a positive donation is made to increase the surplus then this is sufficient for us to 
conclude that in at least those cases the models are incomplete and concern for 
efficiency should be accounted for.  
 
2.2. Experimental procedure 
A total of 132 undergraduate students from various disciplines were recruited on 
campus at Karlstad University to participate in the study. The experiment was 
conducted in 12 sessions in groups of 11 students, although in order to ensure a full 
head count, 12 students were summoned on each occasion. Only the first 11 arrivals 
were accepted as participants while the 12th was paid a show-up fee of 50 SEK. The 
participants were seated individually with unobstructed views of all other participants. 
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Each participant was given an envelope containing full instructions (a translation is 
available from the author upon request) as well as an identity number. The same identity 
number was printed on the back of the questionnaire. The session began with the 
experimenter explaining how the payment procedure guaranteed complete anonymity 
for the participants after which the distribution part of the survey was explained first 
along with the incentive mechanism. This part of the experiment took between 20-25 
minutes. The distribution task was explained using an example with a distribution 
similar to those in the survey. The incentive mechanism was illustrated using trial runs 
assuming different varying S-values. The cognitive demand on the students is 
considerable in this kind of experiment, so great pains were taken to ensure that the 
students had understood the nature of the task as well as the incentive mechanism.6 The 
three distributions were presented on the overhead and their characteristics were 
described to the subjects in a similar fashion as described in section 3. In order to assist 
the subjects in the distribution questions they were told the following: 
“If you have difficulty in answering the questions you may wish to follow the 
following procedure: 
Set S in Alternative 2 to 300 SEK and ask yourself which alternative you would 
prefer. If you like both alternatives equally then set S=300. However, if you prefer 
Alternative 2 then lower the value of S slightly and ask yourself the same question 
again. Repeat the procedure, decreasing or increasing the value of S until you reach 
a point where you consider the two alternatives to be equal in value.”  
 
The participants were given time to answer the distribution questions before the 
donation to the surplus task was presented.  The subjects were asked to place their pens 
on their tables to signal when they had finished each task. Finally the participants were 
required to fill in some information regarding their socioeconomic status. The variables 
collected were gender, number of siblings, political preferences and choice of discipline. 
 
                                                 
6 Nonetheless, it is possible that some participants still did not grasp that stating their equality equivalence 
S is the dominant strategy.  Thus they were also told that if they did not fully understand the incentive 
mechanism, they should “trust” the instructor in that it was in their best interest to answer in accordance 
with their preferences and that they had nothing to gain, but could possibly lose by not doing so. They 
were further told that the instructor would stay behind at the end of the session to explain the incentive 
mechanism more thoroughly if they did not wish to ask questions in front of the group.  
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Each experimental session lasted about 40 minutes. The questionnaires were collected 
and one was picked at random. A dice was thrown by the instructor to establish for 
which of the four questions the payoff would occur. For questions 1-3 the incentive 
mechanism was evoked where a number “R” was picked at random from a box. If R≤S 
then the pay-offs were according to Alternative 1 whereas if R>S then all the 
individuals received the same pay-off R. In the former case, identity numbers were 
picked one by one at random with the associated pay-offs increasing in magnitude as 
the numbers were picked. The instructor noted the payoffs on a sheet of paper which 
was given to another person and the participants were able to collect their pay-offs 
individually using their identity cards. 
 
3. The models 
The models tested in this study are the difference aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), the social welfare model of Charness and 
Rabin (2000) as well as a more general inequality aversion model. In this section we 
present a general overview of the different models. We begin by considering the two 
difference aversion models. Fehr and Schmidt assume a utility function of the following 
form for individual i 
}0,max{
1
1}0,max{
1
1
j
ji
iii
ji
jiii wwn
ww
n
wU −−−−−−= ∑∑ ≠≠ βα , 
where ii βα ≥ , 10 <≤ iβ  and iw  is the pay-off of individual i. The structure of this 
model incorporates both envy and altruism. The disutility from inequality is greater 
when another individual has a larger pay-off than vice-versa thus the assumption is that 
envy is stronger than altruism. The implication behind 1<iβ  is that the disutility from 
receiving more than others is never so great that the individual is willing to sacrifice 
money without benefiting others.  
 
Bolton and Ockenfels present in the theory of Equity, reciprocity and competition 
(ERC) an unspecified motivation function that is given by  
),,( iii swV =  
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where iw denotes own payoff and is the individuals share of the total payoff. It is 
assumed that that the function increases in own payoff iw , decreases as the relative 
payoff is  moves away from the social reference share n1 . Thus for a given iw , the 
function iV  is maximised when =is n1  , n  being the number of individuals in the 
reference group. In the case where  nsi
1>  the marginal rate of substitution between 
absolute and relative pay-offs will determine how much the individual is willing to 
sacrifice in order to obtain an egalitarian solution. 
 
The difference between the two difference aversion models is that in the Fehr-Schmidt 
model the individual compares her own pay-off with each and every other individual in 
the reference group. In the Bolton-Ockenfels model the individual’s only concern is her 
share of the total surplus and the pay-offs of other individuals do not enter directly into 
the motivation function. In the case where a transfer of money is made from an 
individual with a higher pay-off to an individual with a lower pay-off, utility will 
increase in the first model but remain unchanged in the second. 
 
The social welfare model that we will test is the Quasi-maximin model of Charness and 
Rabin (2000), which is basically a reinterpretation of the Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
model7 where people make sacrifices to increase the payoff of all recipients, but 
especially for the lowest pay-off recipient. The individual’s utility function is given by 
∑
=
−++−=
n
j
jni wwwww
1
21i ])1(}...,min{[)1(U δδγγ , 
where the parameter ]1,0[∈γ  corresponds to the weight the individual places on social 
welfare, expressed as ∑
=
−+
n
j
jn wwww
1
21 ])1(}...,min{[ δδ , versus her own monetary 
payoff iw . When 0=γ  then preferences are consistent with pure self-interest. If 1=γ , 
the individual displays purely “disinterested” preferences where the individual values 
the pay-offs of others as much as her own. The parameter ]1,0[∈δ  measures the degree 
                                                 
7 Charness and Rabin refer to the working paper by Andreoni and Miller from 1998 that was subsequently 
published in 2002. 
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of concern for helping the lowest pay-off recipient versus increasing the total surplus. 
Thus 1=δ  is consistent with the Rawlsian criterion while 0=δ corresponds to 
maximisation of the total surplus.  
 
We also introduce a more general model where utility is assumed to be a function of 
some measure of inequality. With multi-person experiments, it is possible that the level 
of inequality per se is an issue.  For example, in the Carlsson et al (2005) study 
individuals were found to have strong preferences regarding the level of inequality per 
se in the case of income. In order to encompass this we introduce a general function 
assuming that the individual’s utility is dependent on her own payoff iw , the general 
level of inequality φ  and some function ),...,( 1 nwwν  of the pay-offs of others so that 
the utility function is 
[ ]),...,(,,U 1i ni wwwU νφ=  
The function ),...,( 1 nwwν may for example represent concerns for the least pay-off 
individual, concerns for the total surplus, differences between the individuals own pay-
off and the pay-off of others or any combination of the above. We refrain from 
stipulating any precise functional form as the purpose here is merely to obtain some 
measure of the proportion of subjects that have concerns for inequality per se.  
Depending on the values of the stated equality equivalence (S) each individual can be 
categorised into one of the different models. Defining the inequality premium, E, for a 
particular distribution as the maximum amount of money an individual is willing to 
sacrifice from her endowment in order to achieve an equal distribution for the group so 
that E=300-S, we then have the following classification of responses.  
 
1)  If 132 EEE <= then the individual’s preferences fit the Fehr-Schmidt model. The 
distributions in questions 2 and 3 are equivalent in this case as the redistribution of pay-
offs between the other participants does not affect the average distances to the 
individuals own pay-off. It is also necessary that the inequality premium in question 1 
be higher than in the other two questions as the average distance from those with lower 
and higher pay-offs increases, and thus the distribution in question 1 will give the 
individual the lowest utility.  
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2) If 0EEE 321 >== then the individual’s preferences correspond to Bolton and 
Ockenfels model. The ERC model assumes that individuals care only about their 
payoffs relative to the total and are unconcerned regarding the relative pay-offs between 
the other participants. The individual’s share of the total surplus is the same, and thus 
the inequality premiums will be the same in all 3 cases.  
3) If 321 EEE >=  then the individual exhibits quasi-maximin preferences. Since the 
lowest pay-off is the same in the first two questions and increases in the third, the 
inequality premium will decrease in the third question. 
4) If 321 EEE >> , then this implies that the preferences are consistent with the more 
general case where the individual has an aversion for inequality per se. Thus the 
premium that an inequality-averse individual is willing to pay will be decreasing as the 
degree of equality in the distributions increases.   
 
5) If 0EEE 321 === , then preferences correspond to pure self interest where the 
individual disregards the pay-off of others. This is consistent with traditional 
microeconomic theory. 
 
4. Results 
The values for the inequality premiums for the first two questions (E1 and E2) range 
from 0 to 300 with means of 101 and 92 respectively. The corresponding values for E3 
are from 0 to 200 with a mean of 57. Detailed tables including the means and standard 
deviations of the inequality premiums for the total and each group separately are given 
in table A1 in appendix. If we look at the mean values directly, we have that E1 > E2 > 
E3. This implies that preferences are consistent with the inequality aversion model that 
was developed in this paper. However, individuals are heterogeneous between as well as 
within models and we use the inequality premiums of each individual to classify them 
into the different models. 
 
Table 1 below presents the number of participants whose responses are consistent with 
the different models; note again that the groups are mutually exclusive. The group 
“Other” consists of individuals whose preferences do not appear to fit any of the models 
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above. The table also includes the number of individuals in each category that sacrificed 
money in order to increase the total surplus in the follow-up question. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of participants that qualify into the different model categories 
and give surplus increasing donations. 
 Number of respondents 
within each category.   
 (% of total) 
Number of respondents 
that gave surplus 
increasing donations.   
(% of group) 
Fehr-Schmidt 9 (6,8%) 3    (33.3%) 
ERC 28  (21,1%) 9    (32.1%) 
Quasi-Maximi 36  (27,3%) 10    (27.8%) 
Inequality-averse 39  (29,5%) 11     (28.2%) 
Self Interest 10  (7,6%) 0    (0.00%) 
Other 10  (7,6%) 3    (30.0%) 
Total 132  (100%) 36    (27,3%)  
 
The group of responses consistent with our general model of inequality aversion was the 
largest with 39 individuals (29.5%). followed by the difference aversion group 
consisting of the Fehr-Schmidt and the ERC models with a total of 37 individuals. 
Within the difference aversion group the ERC model fares considerably better than the 
Fehr-Schmidt model with more than three times the number of participants falling into 
the former category. The Quasi-maximin model was in close third place with 36 
individuals. Although the difference aversion models appear to perform at least as well 
as the Quasi-maximin model, each group receiving roughly 28% of the respondents, 
nearly a third of the respondents in the difference aversion group made donations in 
order to increase the surplus, thereby also increasing the level of inequality. This is in 
direct conflict with the predictions of both difference aversion models and the 
implication would be that for those individuals at least, the models do not completely 
capture preferences. Nor can we exclude possible preferences for efficiency among 
those individuals within the group who did not make a donation as the disutility from 
the lower payoff and increased inequality may not have compensated for the utility 
derived from the increase in the total surplus. There were 10 individuals (7.5%) in the 
“Self interest” group, i.e. those individuals who were unconcerned with the pay-off of 
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others.8  The group “Others” had the same number of individuals as the Self Interest 
group. The only general pattern observed in this group was that 9 out of 10 of the 
respondents considered the distribution in question 2 to be the worst and as such had the 
highest inequality premiums.  
 
Apart from stating their inequality premium for the three distributions, the participants 
were also required to answer some questions on their socio-economic status. A 
multinomial logit model was used in order to see if it was possible to classify 
respondents into the different model groups based on values of the set of socio-
economic characteristics. The only variable found to have any effect was gender in the 
model group “Self Interest” where 80% of the individuals in the group were male.9  
Consequently, we are not able to explain the difference in preferences using observable 
individual characteristics to any great extent. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction it is possible to estimate the parameters values of the 
Fehr-Schmidt as well as the Charness-Rabin utility functions using the information 
provided in the experiment. The parameter values of both models were calculated and 
the descriptive statistics of these are given in tables A2 and A3.10 The Pearson 
correlation measure between the two parameters α and β for the Fehr Schmidt group 
was found to be -0.625 at a significance level of 0.36. Thus, individuals with higher β 
values tend to have lower α values and vice versa, or in other words, those who are 
more altruistic tend to be less envious and vice versa. In the Quasi-maximin group it 
was found that as many as 11 of the δ parameter values and one of the γ parameter 
values were greater than 1 which is clearly unreasonable as δ>1 implies that the 
parameter for efficiency (1-δ) is less than 0 implying that an increase in efficiency 
lowers the individual’s utility. With the numbers in this particular experiment it is 
                                                 
8 This is considerably less than in previous studies where 30% is the proportion mentioned in some of the 
literature but consistent with results from experiments where reciprocity is not an issue, e.g. Charness and 
Rabin (2000) where the proportion of individuals motivated solely by self-interest is around 10%. 
9 This corresponds with results from previous studies for example Selten and Ockenfels (1998 pg 529). 
However as there are only 10 respondents in the Self Interest group it is not possible to draw any definite 
conclusions from this result. 
10 Bolton and Ockenfels do not use a specific function to describe preferences and in this study. In 
addition, we do not specify a precise functional form for the comparison inequality aversion model. In 
both cases the value of the inequality premium is used as the measure of difference aversion and 
inequality aversion respectively.  
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sufficient that E2>2 E3 for δ to be greater than 1.  The descriptive statistics in the 
appendix also include adjusted parameters where values greater than 1 were set equal to 
1. More than 60% of the adjusted parameter values for efficiency (1-δ) were zero 
implying that efficiency was not a factor considered important by most of the 
respondents. Two of the respondents had adjusted values of γ=1 implying that they have 
purely “disinterested” preferences in that they value the pay-offs of others as much as 
their own.11 
 
The test for efficiency in the follow-up question is rigorous in the sense that those 
individuals who make positive donations to the common surplus are both sacrificing 
money and moving away from the egalitarian solution, and as such their concern for 
efficiency is irrefutable.  However, although the test above is sufficient in order to 
ascertain preferences for efficiency, we cannot rule out such preferences for those who 
do not make such a donation as it is quite possible that the utility gain from the 
increased surplus does not outweigh the disutility from the decrease in own wealth and 
equality. Positive donations were made by 36 (27.3%) individuals. Of these, the 
donations ranged between 5 and 100 SEK, with a mean and standard deviation of 28 
and 22 respectively. These results are in stark contrast to the results from the two-person 
dictator dilemma game by Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2003) who found that 
individuals never violate the fairness constraint in order to increase efficiency. If we 
consider efficiency in Quasi-maximin model, we found 15 individuals (42%) exhibited 
preferences for efficiency within the model.12 Allowing for inaccuracies in model 
specifications we thus have at least 41 individuals (31%) in this study who appear to 
exhibit strong preferences for efficiency. Furthermore, we find the proportion of 
respondents making positive donations, and as such have strong preferences regarding 
efficiency to be stable between the groups (with the exception of the Self-Interest group 
who as expected exhibited no efficiency concerns) which would lead us to believe that 
preferences for efficiency are not overrepresented within the Quasi-maximin group. If 
we accept this notion then the estimate of subjects with efficiency concerns within this 
                                                 
11 One of the two respondents had parameter values δ=γ=1 which corresponds to the extreme case where 
the individuals only concern is the for the lowest pay-off recipient. 
12 There were 15 respondents within the Quasi-maximin model who either had a positive parameter for 
efficiency (14), gave a surplus increasing donation (10) or both.  
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study would then be 51 or roughly 38.5%. These results support the conclusions of 
Engelmann and Strobel that distribution concerns are a significant factor in pure 
distributional situations,13 Fehr and Schmidt (2004) argue that the relevance of the 
efficiency motive is largely restricted to students of economics and business 
administration who value efficiency rather than equality. It might be the case that 
students of economics may have been taught that efficiency should be considered as an 
important issue and as such would value equity less and efficiency more than students 
of other disciplines so we checked for subject pool effects in this issue. 72 of the 
participants were students of economics who had completed at least one term of 
economics while the remaining 60 participants came from various other disciplines.  Of 
these 20 economists (27.8%) and 16 non-economists (26.7%) gave surplus increasing 
donations. We tested using a Chi-2 test whether it is more likely that economists gave 
positive donations than non-economists. Similarly, we also checked for any relationship 
between choice of discipline and surplus concerns.  In addition we conducted t-tests to 
check if the mean donations differed between the two groups in that economists 
contributed more toward increasing the total surplus than others. The results show no 
significant difference between economists and non-economists in any of the tests 
conducted. Thus, our results do not support the argument made by Fehr and Schmidt 
that efficiency concerns are mainly restricted to students of economics and business. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper uses a distributional experiment in order to test the performance of some of 
the better known social preference theories and efficiency concerns in a neutral arena in 
order to examine how people respond to unfair outcomes in multi-person setting. The 
results show that the individuals in this study are heterogeneous and that they do not 
follow any single notion of fairness or inequality aversion. The number of subjects that 
qualified into the three categories was fairly even with the largest proportion of subjects 
falling into the reference inequality aversion model closely followed by the difference 
aversion and quasi-maximin models.  Within the difference aversion group we found 
that the ERC model performed considerably better than the Fehr-Schmidt model with 
more than three times the number of participants falling into the former category. 
                                                 
13 Fehr and Schmidt (2004) also argue that the relevance of the efficiency motive is largely restricted to 
non-strategic interactions. 
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Although the difference aversion category appear to perform at least as well as the other 
two, contrary to the model specification nearly a third of the respondents in the group 
made donations in order to increase the surplus. While difference aversion models may 
provide an insight into players’ willingness to donate to others when ahead, they cannot 
explain donations which lead to an increased level of inequality. This suggests that in at 
least a third of the cases the difference aversion models do not completely capture 
preferences. Finally, we found that roughly one third of the respondents have quite 
strong concerns for the total surplus. It is sometimes argued that the relevance of the 
efficiency motive is largely restricted to students of economics and business 
administration and is of less concern to students of other disciplines. This study found 
no such correlation.  
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Appendix A-Descriptive statistics tables 
 
 
Table A1: Descriptives of the Equality premiums for all categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Estimations of the parameter values for the Fehr- Schmidt category. 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
α 0.9519 1.03858 0.13 3.33 
β 0.3444 0.29439 0.00 0.67 
 
 
 
Table A3: Estimations of the parameter values for Quasi-maximin category. 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
γ_adjusted 0.3970 0.19847 0.08 1.00 
δ_adjusted 0.9267 0.13605 0.48 1.00 
unadjusted γ values 0.3984 0.20294 0.08 1.05 
unadjusted δ values 0.9571 0.15922 0.48 1.11 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total E1 
E2 
E3 
100.98 
91.88 
56.86 
59.570 
54.324 
48.659 
0 
0 
0 
300 
300 
200 
Fehr-Schmidt E1 
E2 
E3 
90.56 
51.67 
51.67 
41.416 
44.159 
44.159 
20 
0 
0 
140 
100 
100 
ERC E1 
E2 
E3 
91.79 
91.79 
91.79 
37.348 
37.348 
37.348 
20 
20 
20 
150 
150 
150 
Quasi maximin E1 
E2 
E3 
113.06 
113.06 
53.33 
51.036 
51.036 
45.529 
30 
30 
0 
300 
300 
150 
Inequality aversion E1 
E2 
E3 
136.02 
100.21 
52.05 
58.739 
52.541 
49.227 
20 
10 
0 
250 
220 
200 
Self interest E1 
E2 
E3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Others E1 
E2 
E3 
57 
111.50 
52 
38.601 
41.637 
51.597 
0 
10 
0 
120 
150 
120 
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Appendix B- Translation of the exact presentation of the questions in the 
questionnaire. 
 
Questions 1-3. 
You have just been shown an example of your task by the monitor. You will now be 
required to answer three questions that are similar to the example. 
 For Alternative 1, the total allocation of money is 1800 SEK for all three questions and 
your share is always 300 SEK. 
The questions differ in that the allocation between the participants becomes more even. 
The distribution in question 2 is more even than in question 1 and question 3 in turn, is 
more even than in question 2. In addition the lowest pay-off increases to 150 SEK in 
question 3. 
 
The distributions for Alternative 1 for the three questions are presented below. 
 
Alternative 1 
Question 1       Question 2                           Question 3 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 150 300 600
SEK
N
um
be
r o
f p
er
so
ns
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 150 300 600
SEK
N
um
be
r o
f p
er
so
ns
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 150 300 600
SEK
N
um
be
r o
f p
er
so
ns
          
You receive 300 SEK            You receive 300 SEK            You receive 300 SEK 
6 people receive 0 SEK      5 people receive 0 SEK         10 people receive 150 SEK 
3 people receive 300 SEK      5 people receive 300 SEK 
1 person receives 600 SEK 
 
 
Alternative 2 
 
All participants (including you) receive the same amount _S_ SEK. 
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Answer 1 
 
  I like the distribution in Alternative 1 in question 1 as much as the distribution in 
Alternative 2 when S=_______ SEK. 
 
  
 
Answer 2 
 
  I like the distribution in Alternative 1 in question 2 as much as the distribution in 
Alternative 2 when S=_______ SEK. 
 
 
Answer 3 
 
  I like the distribution in Alternative 1 in question 3 as much as the distribution in 
Alternative 2 when S=_______ SEK. 
 
 
 
Question 4. 
In this question you have the possibility to give away money, if you so wish, from your 
allocation to the others in the group. For every SEK you choose to give away, each of 
the other participants will receive 0.25 SEK more.  
 
Each person in the group receives 100 SEK. 
 
Answer 4 
 
I wish to give away _____ SEK from my 100 SEK to the others in the group. 
 
 1
Gender, Risk and Stereotypes. 
Dinky Daruvala 
Karlstad University 
 
Abstract 
This paper reports results from an economic experiment where respondents are asked to make choices 
between risky outcomes for themselves and others. In addition, we elicit information about the 
respondents’ perception of others risk preferences. We investigate whether subjects’ own risk preferences 
and gender stereotypes are reflected in the prediction they make for the risk preferences of others and the 
way this occurs. We find no significant difference in risk preferences between men and women in the 
experiment. However, both men and women perceive women to be more risk averse than men. When 
predicting other people’s risk preferences, the respondents tend to use a combination of their own risk 
preferences and stereotypes.  Moreover, when making risky choices for others, the respondents generally 
use a combination of their own risk preferences and their average predicted risk preference of the targeted 
group.  
 
Keywords: gender, risk aversion, risk predictions. 
 
JEL Classification: A12, C91, D81, J16. 
 
1. Introduction 
There are a wide range of areas within modern society where people are required to 
make decisions involving risk on behalf of others i.e. policy makers, community 
leaders, physicians, financial advisors etc. In a situation where the risks are not borne by 
the decision maker, then, given no paternalism, the optimal decision would be one that 
reflects the will of those the decision affects. This requires an unbiased perception of the 
risk preference of those affected and that the decision made should perfectly reflect that 
perception. Although numerous experiments have been conducted on the measurement 
of risk preferences (e.g.: Carlsson et. al, 2005; Holt and Laury, 2002; Isaac and Duncan, 
2000; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992), relatively little work has been undertaken on 
measuring how people predict the risk preferences of others (Hsee and Weber, 1997, 
1998, 1999; Siegrist, et al., 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2002, a,b; Chakravarty et. al, 
2005), and as far as we are aware, the only study that has  investigated how people 
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make choices for others in situations where the outcome may have various levels of risk 
is Chakravarty et al, 2005.1  
 
This paper reports results from an incentive-compatible real-money risk experiment 
where participants were required to make choices between risky outcomes for 
themselves and others. Furthermore, we elicit information regarding the respondents’ 
perception of other peoples risk preferences. We use the results to bring together a 
number of issues. We examine the accuracy of individuals’ forecasts and the extent in 
which individuals own risk attitudes and the gender of the target are reflected in the 
prediction they make for the risk preferences of others.  In addition, we examine 
whether subjects make risky choices on behalf of other people based solely on their 
expectation of the risk preference of those affected or whether their own risk attitudes 
are reflected in their choice.   
 
While many neo-classical economists may assume that people have an unbiased 
perception of reality including predicting others’ risk preferences, psychologists have 
presented a number of theories concerning people’s perception of the risk preferences of 
others. The most straightforward of these theories is based on the false consensus effect 
and what Hsee and Weber (1997) refer to as the default hypothesis that simply states 
that people believe that others think like themselves and therefore predict the same risk 
preference for others.2 Support for the default theory was found by Hsee and Weber 
(1997) as well as in a recent experiment by Chakravarty et al (2005).3 Within the Risk-
as-value hypothesis formulated by Brown (1965) people perceive themselves to be 
more risk seeking than their peers based on the related assumptions that risk seeking is 
an admirable characteristic (Shapira 1995) and that they are better than others – ergo, 
they are more likely to have a higher propensity for risk than others.4  Hsee and Weber 
(1997) find evidence for what they refer to as the Risk-as-feelings hypothesis which 
                                                 
1 The paper by Chakravarty et al. came to our attention after the experiments in this study were 
performed. 
2 The default hypothesis is analogous to the false consensus effect in social psychology where people tend 
to overestimate the degree to which their own behaviour, attitudes, beliefs etc. are shared by other people 
(Ross, Greene and House, 1977).  
3 In the Chakravarty et al study, respondents were required to predict the average risk propensity of the 
other participants by guessing the average choice made by all participants.                                  
4 See Siegrist et al., (2002) and references therein for results from studies testing the risk-as-value 
hypothesis. 
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states that an individual will predict that another is more risk neutral than them.5  This 
theory is based on the notion that people often have strong feelings when faced with a 
risky choice and they have difficulty in conceiving that others have the same depth of 
feeling as themselves and therefore the prediction for the target regresses to risk 
neutrality.6 
 
The hypotheses above use the premise that the predictor will project their determination 
of another’s risk preference on the basis of their own, the Stereotype hypothesis on the 
other hand is based on the theory that the prediction of another person’s risk preference 
is based on the predictor’s stereotype about the group to which the target belongs in 
terms of gender, race etc. Studies by Hsee & Weber (1997, 1999) find evidence of such 
stereotyping on the basis of race while studies by Eckel & Grossman (2002,a,b) and 
Siegrist et al., (2002)  find  evidence of  gender stereotyping when examining subjects 
predictions of the risk aversion of others. 
 
Gender differences in risk responses are well documented in a number of different fields 
and although most of the empirical work suggests that women are indeed more risk 
averse than men, the evidence is not clear cut. Byrnes, et al., (1999) conducted a meta-
analysis of 150 studies finding a significant difference in the risk attitudes of men and 
women. Men were generally greater risk takers although the gender difference varied 
with the risky environment. Studies exploring gender differences in risk aversion in the 
context of non-financial decisions concerning for example health (e.g: Kristiansen, 
1990; Swanson, Dibble, and Trocki, 1995; Hersch, 1996) and traffic (e.g: Hersch, 1996;  
Brinig, 1995; Svenson, 1978)  behaviour find evidence of women’s greater risk 
aversion. A number of studies indicate women are more risk averse than men in 
financial risk taking; see for example Sunden and Surette (1998), Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998), Bajtelsmit, Bernasek and Jianakoplos (1999), Pålsson (1996). The 
same pattern is observed from a number of experimental studies eg: Levin et al, (1988), 
                                                 
5 See Loewenstein et al., (2001) for a detailed description of the Risk-as-feelings theory.  
6 Hsee and Weber (1997) find that the risk-as-feelings hypothesis holds when the target is anonymous. 
However, in a second study, they find that when respondents are asked to predict the risk preferences of 
an individual visible to them, the results are consistent with the default hypothesis. The authors explain 
the results by arguing that it is easier for individuals to project their own feelings towards risk in the case 
where the target is vivid  than when the target is abstract.    
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Eckel and Grossman (2002,a,b), Powell and Ansic (1997), Levy, Elron and Cohen 
(1999). However, not all studies support the stereotype that men are less risk averse 
than women in financial decision making. Schubert et al (1999) find no general gender 
differences when subjects face contextual decisions7 and argue that adequate 
conclusions cannot be drawn using results from abstract gambling experiments.8 Other 
studies that contradict the notion of gender differences in risk attitudes are Kruse and 
Thompson (2001, 2003) as well as Holt and Laury (2002).  
 
Even if the evidence on whether women are in fact more risk averse than men is not 
clear cut, the mere perception that women have a lower risk propensity may lead to 
statistical discrimination that has an impact on womens’ (and mens’) opportunities, 
incomes and choices. If women are perceived to be less able to make risky decisions, 
then they may be less likely to be given corporate promotions underlying the concept of 
the “glass ceiling”. Johnson and Powell (1994) find no differences in decision quality 
and risk propensity between male and female managers and argue that the exclusion of 
women from such positions may be based on false stereotypes derived from 
observations from the non-managerial population. Eckel and Grossman (2002, a.) note 
that if women are perceived to be more risk averse or less willing to risk the breakdown 
of negotiation then they may receive less generous initial offers in employment 
negotiations and face more aggressive bargaining, leading to lower negotiated wages.9 
Wang (1994) finds evidence of gender stereotyping by financial advisors where female 
clients were offered lower risk-return investments relative to those offered to male 
clients. Stereotyping may even have effects in the area of health care where evidence 
from several studies show that doctors tend to prescribe less aggressive treatment for 
women patients compared with men exhibiting the same symptoms (e.g., Schulman, et. 
al. 1999; Tobin et. al. 1987), but where patient preferences alone do not explain these 
                                                 
7 The authors conducted an experiment where subjects were required to make abstract gambling decisions 
as well as financially motivated risky decisions embedded in an investment or insurance context.  
8 In addition they point out those results from survey data showing gender specific risk attitudes may be 
due to differences in individuals’ opportunity sets. This theory is supported partly by the results of Säve-
Söderberg who studied premium pension portfolio choices and found that after controlling for a wide 
range of variables that the only significant gender difference appeared at the upper end of the risk 
distribution. 
9 Eckel and Grossman also refer to a model developed by Vesterlund (1997) where if more risk-averse 
workers can be identified, then they (women if the stereotype is applied) face a distribution of wages that 
is stochastically dominated by the distribution for the less-risk-averse group even when the productivity 
of the two types of workers are identical. 
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gender disparities (e.g., Saha, et al., 1999; Schecter et. al. 1996), indicating that the 
difference in treatment may be caused by the physician’s gender stereotype of patients’ 
risk preferences.  
 
The gender stereotype with regard to risk is one of the issues considered in this study. 
We also examine the extent to which subjects’ own risk preferences are reflected in the 
predictions they make for the risk preferences and the choices they make on the behalf 
of others. Although we found no significant relationship between gender and stated risk 
preference, both sexes predicted that women were more risk averse than men. The 
results also suggest that the participants own risk preferences are a significant factor 
when they estimate the risk preferences of others. Furthermore, when required to make 
risky choices on behalf of the other participants, we find again that the individuals own 
attitudes to risk is a factor on which they base their choice. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: sections 2 and 3 provide a description of 
the experimental design and procedure. The results from the study are presented in 
section 4 followed by the conclusions in section 5. 
 
2. The Experiment 
The experiment was conducted in two parts. The purpose of the first part was to elicit 
the risk preference of each of the subjects as well as the subject’s prediction of the risk 
preference of each of the other participants in that session for the same risk scenario.  In 
the second part the subject was required to make a similar decision for the rest of the 
group as a whole but at no risk to themselves.  
 
In the first part of the experiment, individuals were asked to state their certainty 
equivalence for a gamble with a 50% probability of receiving either 200 SEK or 0 
SEK.10 We use this approach rather than the standard reservation price method in order 
to minimise any loss aversion effects. The question was presented in a similar fashion to 
the example below. 
 
                                                 
10 At the time the experiment was conducted, 1 USD = 7.3 SEK 
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Figure 1: Description of the question used to determine individuals’ own certainty 
equivalences. 
Question 1  
 
You are presented with two alternatives below.  
Alternative 1: 
A dice is thrown 
In the case of an odd number you receive 0 SEK 
In the case of an even number you receive  200 SEK 
 
Alternative 2: 
You are unconditionally given  C SEK  
 
For what value of C do you consider Alternative 1 to be as good as Alternative 2? 
 
Answer: I like both alternatives equally when C  = _______ SEK 
 
In order to avoid strategic responses, a modification of the Becker DeGroot Marschack 
(1964) procedure is used where the certainty equivalences are matched with a randomly 
drawn number to determine the individual’s payoff. The response to question 1 provides 
each individual’s own certainty equivalence (OCE ), which is used as the measure of 
risk aversion.  
 
The follow up question in this part of the experiment then asked each participant to 
predict the response to question 1 by each of the other 10 participants in their session.  
The only information a subject has on which to base their prediction are the visual clues 
provided by observing the others. These responses can be used to calculate  
 
? each individual’s average prediction of the whole group ( PCE ) 
? each individual’s average prediction for the men in the group( mPCE ) 
? each individual’s average prediction for women in the group( fPCE ) 
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The information obtained from the responses to the question and its follow-up i.e. an 
individual’s own and their prediction of the certainty equivalence’s of others, allows 
analysis of the issues presented in the introduction: (i) To what extent are subjects’ own 
risk preferences reflected in the prediction they make for the risk preferences of others? 
(ii) Is there a stereotype effect with regard to gender and risk?.  
 
Within the second part of the experiment, each participant faced the same choice as in 
question 1.  The difference was that the choice was made on behalf of the other 
participants in the session. Each individual was given 200 SEK regardless of the 
outcome for the others in the group.  The payment was made to the subject to avoid 
negative feelings of not receiving any money themselves as well as an attempt to anchor 
the feeling that the decision made for others is a payment for performing a “task”.  The 
subject would thus be more inclined to make the effort to reach a well considered 
decision. The question was presented in a similar fashion to the example below: 
 
Figure 2: Description of the question used to determine the individual’s certainty 
equivalence when the outcome affects others. 
Question 2 
 
Your task is to make a decision on behalf of the other people in this group.  You will 
receive 200 SEK for this task regardless of the outcome for the others in the group.  
 
Alternative 1: 
 
A dice is thrown 
 
In the case of an odd number the other 10 people each receive 0 SEK 
 
In the case of an even number the other 10 people each receive 200 SEK 
 
Alternative 2: 
 
Each of the other 10 people unconditionally receive  C SEK  
 
You will receive 200 SEK regardless of the outcome in both alternatives.  
 
For what value of C do you consider Alternative 1 to be as good as Alternative 2? 
 
 
Answer: I like both alternatives equally when C  = _______ SEK 
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The responses will allow some interesting comparisons between the first and second 
part of the experiment. First of all we can test to what extent the subjects based their 
answer on what they believe the rest of the group’s preference would be (which can be 
calculated by the individual’s average prediction of the whole group in the follow up 
question in part 1). Second, and more importantly, we can test whether the individual’s 
response in question 2 reflects the actual will of the group as ascertained by calculating 
the average of the actual certainty equivalence stated by the rest of the group in the 
results of question 1.   
 
3. Experimental Procedure 
The study was conducted with undergraduates from various disciplines at Karlstad 
University in Sweden. A total of 71 men and 61 women in groups of 11 participated in 
12 separate experimental sessions, each of which lasted around 40 minutes. There was a 
minimum of 2 and maximum of 8 women in each session. In order to guarantee a full 
head count at each session, 12 students were summoned on each occasion but only the 
first 11 arrivals were accepted.  The 12th was paid a show-up fee of 50 SEK.  The 
participants were seated with unobstructed views of each other but without being able to 
see the written responses of other individuals.  They were specifically instructed not to 
communicate with each other for the duration of the session. Each participant was given 
an envelope containing a questionnaire with full instructions as well as a small card 
with a unique identity number (1 – 132).  The same number was printed on the back of 
the questionnaire. The participants were requested to keep this identity number secret. 
Verbal instructions with supporting overheads along with the written instructions were 
used throughout the session.  The payment procedure and the anonymity it ensured was 
explained at the beginning of each session. The participants were informed that they 
would be given time to answer each question before the next was presented. They were 
instructed to place their pens on their table to indicate when they had finished each task.  
They were made aware that they could ask for assistance at any time. 
 
At the start of each session, the tasks and the incentive mechanism were explained using 
an example similar to question 1. The incentive mechanism was illustrated with trial 
runs assuming different C values. The cognitive demand on the students is considerable 
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in this kind of experiment, so great pains were taken to ensure that the students had 
understood the nature of the task as well as the incentive mechanism. In order to assist 
the subjects in the certainty equivalence questions, they were asked to consider the 
following:  
 
If you have difficulty in answering the questions, consider the following procedure:  
Set C to any random number and ask yourself whether you would prefer alternative 
1 or 2 for that specific value of C. If you like both alternatives equally, then keep 
that value as your answer to C. If you prefer alternative 2 then lower the value of C 
slightly and ask yourself the same question again.  Similarly if you prefer 
alternative 1, then raise the value of C slightly. Repeat the steps, iteratively 
increasing or decreasing the value of C until you reach the value where you are 
equally happy with both alternatives.  
 
To identify each participant for the responses required to the follow up exercise to 
question 1, one of the letters (A – K) boldly printed to A4 size was distributed to 
each of the participants. The subjects were then told to regard each of the other 
participants in the session and predict their responses to the first question using the 
alphabet convention to identify each subject within their answer.  While the 
subjects were performing this task, the experimenter was discretely noting the 
gender of the participant associated with each letter. Being students, the group was 
visually fairly homogenous in terms of ethnic background, age, dress etc. and the 
primary differentiating characteristic was gender.   
 
At the end of each session, the payoff procedure was evoked. This had been 
explained to the participants at the beginning of the session. The method was that a 
number “R” was picked at random from a box. If the value of R > C, alternative 2 
of the question was applicable and the individual received the higher amount R.  
When R < C, a dice was thrown by the instructor to invoke the gamble described in 
alternative 1 i.e. odd yields 0 SEK, even yields 200 SEK. The questionnaires were 
collected and the instructor threw a dice to establish which of the two questions 
would be used in the payoff procedure. If the pay-off procedure was used in 
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question 1, then the process above was repeated for every questionnaire, so that 
each individual’s personal response affected their reward. In the case of question 2, 
one of the questionnaires was picked at random by the instructor and used to evoke 
the payment procedure once only but for the others in the group.  The individual 
whose questionnaire is picked of course received 200 SEK. The entire payment 
process was conducted in full view of the participants in the session. The value of 
the payoffs for each individual (using their unique identity number) was written on 
the white-board and transcribed onto a sheet of paper.  The instructor gave the 
payoff information to a third party.  The participants collected their payment 
privately from the third party using the card with their identity number.  
 
4. Results 
Subjects own certainty equivalence 
The estimates of participants own certainty equivalences )(OCE  showed no difference 
between the risk preferences of men and women. The mean certainty equivalence of all 
participants was 97 SEK which is fairly close to the risk neutrality level of 100 SEK. 
The mean for females (98.28 SEK) was only slightly higher than that for males (95.9 
SEK) and the null hypothesis that the mean OCE  does not differ between the sexes 
cannot be rejected (t=0.464, p=0.643). This result was confirmed using the Mann- 
Whitney test (p=0.913). Detailed descriptive statistics of the participants OCEs and the 
number of respondents in each risk category by gender are given in tables A1 and A2 in 
the appendix. 
Even if the mean certainty equivalence is the same, the distribution of risk preferences 
can differ. Figure 3 below illustrates the distribution of the participants’ certainty 
equivalences in intervals by gender. A Chi-2 test shows no significant relationship 
( 76.13)12(2 ≅χ , p= 0.32) between gender and the risk preference interval chosen by 
the individual. This result is contrary to the majority view where women are generally 
regarded to be more risk averse than men.  
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Figure 3.  Histogram illustrating the distribution of OCEs in intervals by gender.  
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Subjects predictions for the certainty equivalence of others. 
In addition to choosing their own certainty equivalence, each subject also predicted the 
certainty equivalences of each of the other ten participants in the session making a total 
of 1320 predictions. Each subject’s mean prediction for males ( mPCE ) and females 
( fPCE ) as well as for the whole group ( PCE ) in each session is calculated so that 
three prediction observations are assigned to each participant. These are reported in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Average certainty equivalence predictions for subjects by gender of target and 
predictor. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
Average predicted certainty 
equivalences. 
Test statistics  for 
differences in subjects’ 
mean predictions for men 
and women 
 
 
Predictors 
 
 
N 
mPCE  fPCE  PCE  t-test  Wilcoxon sign 
 rank test 
Female 
subjects 
 
61 
94.58 
(20.03) 
86.31 
(20.28) 
90.38 
(16.93) 
t=3.757 
p<0.000 
Z=-3.833 
p<0.000 
Male 
subjects 
 
71 
91.83 
(19.68) 
82.89 
(19.82) 
87.20 
(17.63) 
t=8.937 
  p<0.0001 
Z=-4.812 
p<0.000 
All Subjects  
132
93.10 
(19.23) 
84.47 
(20.03) 
88.67 
(17.32) 
t=5.901 
p<0.000 
Z=-6.054 
p<0.000 
 
The gender Stereotype. 
We begin by testing whether there is a gender stereotype with respect to risk 
preferences. Contrary to the actual choices made but consistent with the gender 
stereotype, both sexes predicted that women were more risk averse than men, see table 
1. The latter is consistent with the findings of Eckel & Grossman (2002,a,b) and Siegrist 
et al., (2002). The mean prediction by all subjects of 93.1 for males is significantly 
greater than the mean prediction of 84.47 for females. The mean prediction by women 
for women of 86.3 is significantly smaller than their prediction of 94.58 for men. 
Similarly, men’s mean prediction of 82.89 for women is significantly smaller than their 
prediction of 91.83 for men. In addition the mean predictions for men and women did 
not significantly differ by gender (for men: t=0.819, p=0.414; for women: t=0.979, 
p=0.33). 
 
 
Own preferences versus predictions. 
In this section we compare individuals’ own risk preference with their prediction of the 
risk preferences of others. First, we address the issue of whether subjects’ predictions of 
others tend to regress to risk neutrality. If this is the case, then risk averse individuals 
will generally predict that others are less risk averse than themselves and vice versa for 
risk seekers.  Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix show the participants’ predictions 
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relative to own preference by risk category. If we consider subjects’ average predictions 
for males ( mPCE ) we find that  mPCEOCE <   in 48 cases within the risk averse 
category consisting of 63 individuals.  Similarly, for risk seekers we find that 
mPCEOCE >  in 36 of 39 cases. In both categories we can confirm that predictions 
regress towards neutrality ( ;00.0,28.17)1(2 == pχ  00.0,92.27)1(2 == pχ  
respectively)  
In the case of subjects’ predictions for women ( fPCE ), we find somewhat different 
results for the risk averse category where only 24 of 63 cases are consistent with the 
theory that fPCEOCE < , thus we can reject the hypothesis that fPCEOCE < for risk 
averse individuals. The predictions by subjects for women follow the pattern for men in 
the risk seeking group with fPCEOCE > in 38 of 39 cases. Thus, in the case of fPCE  
only the risk seeking group’s predictions’ regress to risk neutrality. 
 
Thus, individuals’ risk predictions for others tend to regress towards risk neutrality. In 
the case of risk averse individuals however, this apparently depends on the gender of the 
target. Within the risk seeking group the respondents consistently predict the risk 
preference of others to be lower regardless of the sex of the target.  
 
We can illustrate the relationship between individuals’ own risk preferences and their 
prediction of the risk preferences of others using the piecewise linear regression model 
below: 
jjjj
i
j DOCEOCEPCE εβββ +−++= )100(210  
where the dependent variable ijPCE  is the prediction made by individual j of the 
average certainty equivalence of the other participants in the session belonging to 
gender i . In addition to the own certainty equivalence, we include the risk premium 
)100( jOCE−  for risk seeking respondents. The dummy variable, jD , is equal to one if 
the risk premium is lower than 0, i.e. if the respondent is risk seeking. Finally, jε  is a 
normally distributed error term. So if the individual is risk averse or risk neutral their 
average prediction for gender i  is given by 
jj
i
j OCEPCE εββ ++= 10 . 
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If the individual is risk seeking it is given by, 
jj
i
j OCEPCE εββββ +−++= )()100( 2120  
Consequently, if 2β  is positive, the intercept will be higher for risk seeking individuals 
and at the same time the slope will be flatter compared with risk averse individuals. The 
results of the regressions are given in table 2 below. A chow test11 does not reveal any 
gender differences and therefore we do not perform separate regression for the 
predictions by male and female participants. 
 
Table 2: Regression results for certainty equivalence predictions for men and women by 
all subjects. 
 Coefficients t-value p-value 
PCEf     
Intercept ( 0β ) 19.28 2.921 0.004 
OCE ( 1β ) 0.728 9.619 0.000 
(100-OCE) *D ( 2β ) 0.621 4.968 0.004 
 
R2=0.477 
 
   
PCEm     
Intercept ( 0β ) 38.94 5.854 0.000 
OCE ( 1β ) 0.592 7.759 0.000 
(100-OCE)*D ( 2β ) 0.367 2.954 0.004 
 
R2=0.424 
 
   
 
 
The coefficient β2 is significant and positive in both cases. The regression equation for 
fPCE  estimates the average prediction for women’s certainty equivalences made by 
risk averse and risk neutral subjects to be 
j
f
j OCEPCE 728.02.19 += . 
While the predictions for women made by risk seeking subjects are estimated at: 
j
f
j OCEPCE 116.064.75 +=  
                                                 
11 F[3,126]=0.596,p=0.62 and F[3,126]=1.75576, p=0.16 for mPCE  and fPCE respectively. 
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Similar expressions can be constructed for the prediction of males’ certainty 
equivalence. In figure 3 below we illustrate the regression predictions by the 
participants. 
 
Figure 3: Predictions for males and females by all subjects. 
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Firstly, predictions of female certainty equivalences are lower irrespective of the risk 
category or gender of the predictor. We see that the regression line for fPCE  intersects 
the 45o line at =OCE 70.6, suggesting that the gender stereotype leads to moderately 
risk averse individuals predicting that women are more risk averse than themselves. 
Secondly, there is a significant and positive relationship between own certainty 
equivalence and the predicted certainty equivalences. Thus, subjects’ perceptions of 
others’ risk preferences are clearly influenced by their own preference.  
 
The results allow us to reject the default theory that the participants believe that others 
have the same risk preference as themselves. The risk-as-value hypothesis is based on 
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the assumption that risk taking is admired in our society and people would wish to 
consider that they possess this admirable characteristic to a greater degree than others. 
The results from the predictions by risk averse individuals refute the risk-as-value 
hypothesis where the assumption is that individuals will consistently predict others as 
being more risk avert than them. However, because 2β  is positive, the slope is flatter for 
risk seeking individuals and as such the absolute distances between sOCE'  and sPCE'  
is greater for this group it could be argued that risk-as feelings may play some role in 
the predictions people make for others.12   
 
The risk-as-feelings hypothesis states that people do not believe that others share the 
same depth of feeling toward risk as them and thus tend to predict that others are more 
risk neutral than themselves. The results from this study confirm this theory with the 
exception of predictions for women by the risk averse subjects.  
 
While the findings (at least in the case of predictions for males) appear to conform to 
the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, the results may also be seen as exhibiting a general 
mean reverting tendency, as in this particular case, average sOCE'  lie close to risk 
neutrality and thus what may appear to be regression to risk neutrality for male 
predictions may in fact be predictions regressing to the mean.  
One possible explanation for this result could be the effects of a false consensus effect 
and a gender stereotype effect influencing predictions. The false consensus effect in this 
case would represent a bias that occurs when people overestimate the degree to which 
their risk attitudes are shared by others. For example, although an extremely risk averse 
individual recognises that she is more risk averse than the mean, her estimation of the 
other subjects risk attitude is biased towards her own choice. In the case where the 
target is female, the gender stereotype that women are more risk averse than men will 
lower average predictions of women’s risk attitudes relative that of men. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Risk seekers, recognizing that they have a greater propensity for risky choices than others would 
regard risk seeking as a positive characteristic and would wish to consider that they possess this 
admirable characteristic to a greater degree than others and would thus increase the distance between 
themselves and others, while the opposite would be true for extremely risk averse individuals. 
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Individuals’ choice on behalf of others 
In the second part of the experiment the subjects were required to make a decision, at no 
risk to themselves, but where the outcome of their decision determined the pay-offs of 
the other participants of the session. We use CCE  to denote this choice made by the 
individual. Under the premise that the optimal decision would be one that reflects the 
will of those whom the decision affects, the requirement would be that the subject 
accurately predicts the (average) will of the group and furthermore, bases her decision 
on that prediction. We assign a new variable ACE  (Average Certainty Equivalence) to 
each individual which is the average OCE  stated by the other 10 members of each 
session which we then use in order to make a comparison with PCE  and CCE .  We 
use ACE as an imputed measure to represent the “will of the group”.  We find that 
ACE  is significantly different from PCE  (t=5.478, p<0.000) implying that the subjects 
were, on average, inaccurate in their predictions. In addition, ACE  is found to be 
significantly different from CCE  (t=2.028, t=0.045) implying that the decisions made 
by the subjects did not generally reflect the will of the others in the group. We also find 
that subjects do not base their choice of CCE  solely on their predictions of the others. 
Although the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the 
variables CCE  and PCE  (t=1.952, 0.053) cannot be rejected, the low level of 
significance indicates that other factors are relevant.  
 
We perform a regression in order to ascertain to what degree individuals base their 
choice of outcome for others on what they believe the rest of the group’s preference 
would be and also on their own certainty equivalence value. We use a simple OLS 
regression model below in order to estimate this relationship 
jjjj PCEOCECCE εβββ +++= 210   
where the dependent variable jCCE  is individual j’s certainty equivalence when 
making  the risky choice on behalf of the others in the group. The regression is based on 
the responses from the whole population as a chow test does not reveal any gender 
differences (F[3,126]=0.35138; p=0.79),  thus we cannot motivate not using the 
restricted model.  In addition it was found that own risk preference was not a significant 
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direct factor (although it implicitly enters the model through OCE  and PCE ). The 
results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Regression results for choices made by all subjects on behalf of 
 the other  members of the session. 
 Coefficients t-value p-value Std. error 
CCE     
Intercept 31.638 3.134 0.002 10.094 
OCE 0.297 3.163 0.002 0.094 
PCE 0.363 2.289 0.024 0.159 
 
R2=0.287 
    
 
 
The values of the coefficients are possibly unreliable due to multicollinearity and 
therefore we cannot ascertain the exact weights individuals assign on the two 
variables.13  However, it appears clear that individuals in this study do not base their 
choices for others solely on the predictions they made for the others in the group which 
would be expected if they would wish to reflect what they believed to be the will of the 
group, but also tend to base their choice of CCE  on their own certainty equivalence 
values.  
 
We refrain from excessive speculation on the psychological reasons behind this result 
although one possible factor may possibly be a feeling of paternalism on the part of the 
subject where she believes her choice to be the more “correct” than that of the other 
individuals in the group.   Anchoring problems caused by the experimental design may 
also have contributed to this result as the framing of the questions where the individuals 
were asked to state their own preferences and their beliefs of others may have coloured 
their choice.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The first part of this study was designed to measure and compare the risk propensity of 
individuals as well as their prediction of the risk propensity of others. We find that the 
                                                 
13 Two separate regressions were performed, using a single dependent variable OCE and PCE in each. We 
found the magnitude of the coefficient estimates to be similar to the pooled model.  
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individuals in this study were generally inaccurate in their predictions for others. We 
also find no significant relationship between gender and risk preference, both sexes 
however predict that women are more risk averse than men, which is contrary to the 
actual choices made but consistent with the gender stereotype. 
  
When comparing individuals’ own risk preference with their prediction of the risk 
preferences of others, we find that the category of risk preference to which the 
individual belongs is related to their prediction of the certainty equivalence of others. 
We find that individuals’ risk predictions for others tend to regress towards risk 
neutrality. In the case of risk averse individuals however, this is only the true when the 
target is male. If the risk-as-feelings theory is accepted as the reason behind these 
results, then individuals who are extremely risk averse base their prediction on the 
recognition that they have stronger feelings against risk than most people. However, the 
regression to risk neutrality for the predictions for males may also be interpreted as a 
mean regressing tendency where a false consensus effect, together with a gender 
stereotype effect also provide an explanation for subjects’ predictions for women. It is 
therefore not possible to take an unequivocal position on the validity of the risk-as-
feelings hypothesis when explaining these results and a further study would be required 
in order to confirm the risk-as-feelings hypothesis. If for example, the same subjects 
were confronted with a similar choice as in the first experiment but where the stakes 
were increased ten-fold we may possibly find that many of the risk seeking respondents 
in the first experiment make risk averse choices in the second when the stakes are 
increased.  If the risk-as-feelings hypothesis and thus regression to risk neutrality holds 
that these individuals would then reverse their predictions and believe themselves to be 
more risk averse than others. However, if the respondents still predict that they are less 
risk averse than others, then we would be required to reject the risk-as-feelings 
hypothesis. 
In the second part of the experiment the subjects were required to make a decision, at no 
risk to themselves, but where the outcome of their decision determined the pay-offs of 
the other participants of the session. We find that the individuals in this study do not 
base their choices for others solely on the predictions they made for the others in the 
group which would be expected if they would wish to reflect what they believed to be 
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the will of the group, but also tend to base their choice for others on their own certainty 
equivalence values.  
 
The results suggest several interesting areas for future research. Firstly, experiments 
using varying levels of stakes may provide further insight into the relationship between 
individuals’ own risk preference and their prediction of the risk preferences of others. 
Secondly, experiments where real decision makers are included among the participants 
would facilitate comparison of predictions and decisions made for others vary by the 
different subject categories. Finally, as many decisions made for others are in the non-
financial realm it would be of interest to design experiments that elicit subjects’ risk 
preferences and risk predictions in situations where the risks are non-financial.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1:Descriptive statistics of OCE by gender of subject. 
 Male subjects Female subjects All subjects 
Mean  95.9 98.28 97 
Standard deviation 26.931 31.923 29.25 
range (20,  150) (30,   180) (20,   180) 
N 71 61 132 
 
Table A2: Number of subjects in each risk category by gender. 
 
Table A3: Predictions for women relative to own certainty equivalence 
 by risk category. 
Risk preference category  
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk seeking Total 
fPCEOCE <  24 4 1 29 
fPCEOCE =  7 6 0 13 
fPCEOCE >  32 20 38 90 
Total 63 30 39 132 
 
 
Table A4: Predictions for men relative to own certainty equivalence 
 by risk category. 
Risk preference category  
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk seeking Total 
mPCEOCE <  48 9 2 59 
PCEmOCE =  3 4 1 8 
mPCEOCE >  12 17 36 65 
Total 63 30 39 132 
 
 
Risk preference Male subjects Female subjects All subjects 
Risk averse 
(OCE<100) 
32   (45.1%) 31   (50.8%) 63   (47.7%) 
Risk neutral 
(OCE=100) 
20   (28.2%) 10   (16.4%) 30   (22.7%) 
Risk seeking 
(OCE>100) 
19   (26.8%) 20   (32.8%) 39   (29.5%) 
Total 71   (100%) 61   (100%) 132   (100%) 
